Trends in Dutch Executive Compensation

This article describes the trends in Dutch executive pay contracts. To increase our insight into this subject area, we conducted an empirical study on the basis of remuneration data provided by the executive board members of 71 Dutch listed companies over the period 2002-2004. The study starts from the premise that the characteristics of a unique corporate governance regime, together with the environmental context, shape compensation arrangements. Based on a theoretical research study, which combines our empirical research results with a literature overview, we argue that an optimal compensation arrangement is a trade-off among complying with corporate governance standards, optimizing potential incentives, preventing perverse incentives and offering a competitive pay package. It appears that this trade-off differs with each company at any moment in time. The relevance of this study may be threefold. First, its results can help shape the public debate about the pay of top executives in the Netherlands. Second, it could serve as a blueprint for future research on executive compensation in the specific context of the Dutch governance system. Furthermore, it could help remuneration committees in designing optimal compensation packages.