Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/RAND and Antitrust Injury
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The Market for Intellectual Property: the Case of Complementary Oligopoly
This paper applies a model of complementary oligopoly and anticommons pricing to the market for intellectual property rights. Our model evidences the interesting and often overlooked result that, in the market for complementary goods price coordination and monopolistic pricing do not necessarily represent inefficient equilibria, when compared to the alternative Nash equilibrium. Due to the pecu...
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