Unit versus ad valorem taxes: Monopoly in general equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent, then unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are welfare-wise equivalent. This is contrary to all known claims. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number:H21
منابع مشابه
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