Sophisticated Players and Sophisticated Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
A sophisticated player is an individual who takes the action of the opponents, in a strategic situation, as determined by decision of rational opponents, and acts accordingly. A sophisticated agent is rational in the choice of his action, but ignores the fact that he is part of a strategic situation. We discuss a notion of equilibrium with sophisticated agents, we provide conditions for its existence, and argue that it di®ers systematically from the Nash equilibrium.
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