Sharing wage risk
نویسنده
چکیده
Intro: risk sharing Our paper introduces three innovations with respect to the standard literature. First, labor supply is explicitly recognized and modeled as an endogenous variable, that responds to exogenous shocks. Actually, one of the main topic of the paper is precisely to investigate how adverse income shocks trigger changes in labor supply at the household, and possibly at the risk sharing group level. Second, we consider variations in non labor income, but also in wage. While price uncertainty arguably plays an important role in real life (if only because wage variations are a crucial component of income shocks), not much is known about optimal risk sharing in this context. In the paper, we provide an exhaustive, theoretical characterization of effi cient risk sharing contracts in a general context of uncertainty on wages and incomes; as well as an empirical implementation. Finally, our setting is fairly general; in particular, it allows for different levels of risk aversion, both within and between households. We offer a detailed discussion of identification issues in this framework; we show, in particular, that preferences and the decision process are non parametrically identifiable,1 and we show how long panels can be used in practice to achieve identification. Related literature Outline ∗Townsend acknowledges support from the NICHD-NSF. 1For the distinction between identification and identifiability, see Chiappori and Ekeland (2008).
منابع مشابه
Profit-Sharing as the Optimal Wage Contract
This paper analyses the optimal wage contract when firms face demand uncertainty and workers care about employment stability. Workers choose the firm that offers the highest utility taking into account the future lay-off probabilities; firms choose the wage contract that maximises the residual share of the gains from production. For risk-neutral workers this occurs with any efficient wage contr...
متن کاملStrategic Outsourcing , Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment
We analyze the following questions under imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation? What is the relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing, and equilibrium unemployment? We find that in both scenario...
متن کاملRent-sharing : Does the Bargaining Regime Make a Difference? Theory and Empirical Evidence
This paper analyses whether wages in Germany respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis lies on the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies across di erent systems of wage determination. Those may be categorised into sector-specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. To derive testable ...
متن کاملThe Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing
The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing We combine profit sharing for high-skilled workers and outsourcing of low-skilled tasks in partly imperfect dual domestic labour markets, when the wage rate for low-skilled worker is set by a labor union, to analyze how the implementation of profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing and low-skilled labour market out...
متن کاملInnovation and Rent Sharing in Corporate Wage Setting in Hungary
Skill biased technical change arrived to Hungary with the transition to market economy. As Hungary integrated into the international economy, technical change progressed much faster in some sectors than in mature market economies. That lead to increasing skill premia, intensive rent sharing, and additional benefits for workers at innovative firms. This paper analyses wage setting at Hungarian f...
متن کامل