Understanding Dynamic Games: Limits, Continuity, and Robustness
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چکیده
This book gathers together our joint work (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. Since this work studies, among other things, the way that long-run interactions facilitate cooperation, and our collaboration began in 1980, it seems fitting that the papers appear in a jointly authored volume.
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Understanding Dynamic Games: Limits, Continuity, and Robustness
This book gathers together our joint work (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. Since this work studies, among other things, the way that long-run interactions facilitate cooperation, and our collaboration began in 1980, it seems fitting that the papers appear in...
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