Knowing How vs . Knowing That

More than forty years after Gilbert Ryle published his paper on "Knowing How and Knowing That" in 1945, 1 the problem of practical knowledge has still failed to establish for itself a secure position in the field of problems dealt with by analytic philosophers. Thus even today it can safely be asserted that it is discursive or theoretical knowledge, knowledge linguistically expressed, above all knowledge in the form of propositions, that holds centre stage in analytic treatments of epistemology and cognition. The present volume, which consists of treatments of the presuppositions and specific character of practical knowledge in different spheres, is an attempt to fill this gap. The successive chapters fall into four interrelated groups: (1) those dealing with general theoretical problems associated with knowledge and practice and their interrelations ; (2) those dealing with habit, learning, technique and skill as social phenomena, phenomena tied to socially established traditions and customs; (3) those dealing with that special kind of practical knowledge which is manifested in our use of language; and (4) those dealing with the role of practical knowledge and of tradition in the sphere of art.