Strategy−proofness of social choice functions and non−negative association property with continuous preferences
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the relation between strategy−proofness of resolute (single−valued) social choice functions and its property which we call Non−negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association property (SPAP) of Muller and Satterthwaite(1977). Barbera and Peleg(1990) showed that strategy−proofness of resolute social choice functions implies Modified strong positive association property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy−proofness. We shall show that strategy−proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social choice functions with continuous preferences. I wish to thank anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Citation: Tanaka, Yasuhito, (2002) "Strategy−proofness of social choice functions and non−negative association property with continuous preferences." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 8 pp. 1−7 Submitted: December 20, 2001. Accepted: March 18, 2002. URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2002/volume4/EB−01D70011A.pdf
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