On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players 1
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties. Therefore, we introduce a refinement of this which we call conservative stable weak predictor. We explore some existence properties of this new solution. JEL Classification Number: C70, C71, C72.
منابع مشابه
On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
In this paper we start with analysing conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), (Greenberg (1990)) and find that it has very little predictive power in social environments with farsighted players (modelled in Xue (1998)) although intuitively it is quite nice. Therefore, we go into two directions: modify this solution notion a bit and also restrict the class of feasible deviations. We st...
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