Dynamic Spectrum Allocation for Heterogeneous Wireless Access Networks using Cooperative Bargaining Approach

This work addresses the issue of dynamic spectrum allocation among multiple wireless access networks (ANs) having different (not necessarily competing) technologies. The heterogeneous network architecture considered in this work consists of several such ANs owned by a single service provider (SP). A network entity, called local spectrum controller (LSC), controls the spectrum pool and distributes the available spectrum dynamically among the ANs in a fair manner, when the total available spectrum is inadequate to satisfy simultaneously the aggregate demand from all ANs (individual demand from ANs may vary depending upon several factors). Thus, allocation of spectrum can be viewed as a problem of resolving conflicts among ANs arising out of shortfall in meeting the aggregate demand. So LSC is expected to resort to an adaptive, dynamic allocation technique so that the available spectrum can be utilized in a best possible way. We model the problem as a cooperative bargaining game, in which the ANs act as players, and devise a utility function for the bargaining game to portray the worth of the spectrum availed by an AN. Also, we identify three possible objectives for the LSC, namely minimizing the overall dissatisfaction of the heterogeneous network, maintaining the equality of distribution, and maximizing the proportional fairness. Finally, we study different bargaining strategies vis-àvis max-min fairness concept with respect to the above objectives of LSC. An efficient spectrum allocation strategy has also been identified for each of the objectives of the LSC.