Revenue Optimization against Strategic Buyers
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a revenue optimization algorithm for posted-price auctions when facing a buyer with random valuations who seeks to optimize his -discounted surplus. In order to analyze this problem we introduce the notion of ✏-strategic buyer, a more natural notion of strategic behavior than what has been considered in the past. We improve upon the previous state-of-the-art and achieve an optimal regret bound in O(log T + 1/ log(1/ )) when the seller selects prices from a finite set and provide a regret bound in e O( p T + T 1/4/ log(1/ )) when the prices offered are selected out of the interval [0, 1].
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