Mechanisms for scheduling games with selfish players
نویسندگان
چکیده
Acknowledgments A Ph.D. thesis is the product of several years of work and, therefore, influenced by a lot of people. Here I would like to thank all of you who contributed, in one way or another, to me being able to finish this work. The following people deserve a special mention. First of all I thank Marc Uetz for the supervision during this trajectory. Starting with the final project of my master's degree and followed by my Ph.D. research. I enjoyed working together and I hope that we can keep this fruitful collaboration going for many years to come. I thank all my colleagues of the mathematics department at the University of Twente for the many coffee and lunch discussions and the very good work environment that all of you create together. In particular, I would like to thank my roommates Jasper de Jong and Kamiel Cornelissen and, also, Bodo Manthey (whom I practically consider a roommate as well) for the daily conversations, both about work related and not so much work related topics. For the design of the cover, my gratitude goes to my brother, Piet Hein. You did a great job of finding the cover I did not know I wanted. I want to thank my mother for a childhood that has lead me to pursue a career in research. From going to several Ph.D. defenses at young age, to listening to discussions about your research on waste water treatment during dinner, I know I have a lot to thank you for, and this is certainly part of it. Finally, Marije, thank you for enabling me to do what I do, and for being there for me no matter what. vi Acknowledgments Contents Acknowledgments v 1 Introduction 1 1.
منابع مشابه
Coordinating oligopolistic players in unrelated machine scheduling
We consider the following machine scheduling game. Jobs, controlled by selfish players, are to be assigned to unrelated machines. A player cares only about the finishing time of his job(s), while disregarding the welfare of other players. The outcome of such games is measured by the makespan. Our goal is to design coordination mechanisms to schedule the jobs so as to minimize the price of anarc...
متن کاملDynamic Resource Allocation Games
In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting...
متن کاملCoordination Mechanisms for Selfish Scheduling
In machine scheduling, a set of n jobs must be scheduled on a set of m machines. Each job i incurs a processing time of pij on machine j and the goal is to schedule jobs so as to minimize some global objective function, such as the maximum makespan of the schedule considered in this paper. Often in practice, each job is controlled by an independent selfish agent who chooses to schedule his job ...
متن کاملOptimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games
Resource selection games provide a model for a diverse collection of applications where a set of resources is matched to a set of demands. Examples include routing in traffic and in telecommunication networks, service of requests on multiple parallel queues, acquisition of services or goods with demanddependent prices, etc. In reality, demands are often submitted by selfish entities (players) a...
متن کاملApproximation Algorithms for Distributed and Selfish Agents
Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for various combinatorial optimization problems in such syst...
متن کاملSelfish Scheduling with Setup Times
We study multiprocessor scheduling games with setup times on identical machines. Given a set of scheduling policies (coordination mechanism) on the machines, each out of n players chooses a machine to assign his owned job to, so as to minimize his individual completion time. Each job has a processing length and is of a certain type. Same-type jobs incur a setup overhead to the machine they are ...
متن کامل