An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit

We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the e¤ect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the …nal composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy pro…le that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game. Keywords: Voting; Committees; Undominated Nash Equilibrium JEL classi…cation: D71 Corresponding author: Departament d’Economia. Universitat de Girona. Campus de Montilivi. 17071 Girona. Spain. Telf.: +34972418738. Fax: +34972418032. E-mail address: [email protected] yDepartament d’Economia, Campus de Montilivi, Universitat de Girona, 17071, Girona, Spain zResearch Group in Economic Analysis, Universidade de Vigo, 36200, Vigo (Pontevedra), Spain xDepartament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra (Barcelona), 08193, Spain {Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, San Luis, 5700, Argentina