Monotone Equilibria in Nonatomic Supermodular Games. a Comment * Lukasz Balbus †
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چکیده
Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on the existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomic supermodular games for general action and players spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem with the stated theorem, provide a counterexample, and then correct the result under additional assumptions. keywords: large games, supermodular games, games with strategic complementarities, distributional equilibria JEL codes: C72
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Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment
Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomics supermodular games for general action and types spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem with the stated theorem, provide a counterexample, and then correct the result under additional assump...
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