In nite Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In nite games are widely used in mathematical logic [2, 8, 12]. In particular, in nite games proved to be a useful tool in dealing with the monadic second-order theories of in nite strings and in nite trees [3, 4, 7]. Recently [1, 15, 13], in nite games were used in connection to concurrent computational processes that do not necessarily terminate. For example, an operating system may be seen as playing a game \against" the disruptive forces of users. The classical question of the existence of winning strategies turns out to be of importance to practice. Here we attempt to explain basics of in nite game theory.
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