Evolutionary Games and Periodic Fitness
نویسندگان
چکیده
One thing that nearly all stability concepts in Evolutionary Game Theory have in common is that they use a time-independent fitness matrix. Although this is a reasonable assumption for mathematical purposes, in many situations in real life it seems to be too restrictive. We present a model of an evolutionary game, driven by replicator dynamics, where the fitness matrix is a variable rather than a constant, i.e. the fitness matrix is time-dependent. In particular, by considering periodically changing fitness matrices, we model seasonal effects in evolutionary games. We discuss a model with a continuously changing fitness matrix as well as a related model in which the changes occur periodically at discrete points in time. A numerical analysis shows stability of the periodic orbits that are observed. Moreover, trajectories leading to these orbits from arbitrary starting points synchronize their motion in time. Several examples are discussed.
منابع مشابه
Markov decision evolutionary games with time average expected fitness criterion
We present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have many pairwise interactions between randomly selected players. The fitness of a player depends not only on the actions chosen in the interaction but also on the individual state of the players. Players stay permanently in the system and participate infinitely often in local interactions with other randomly selected pl...
متن کاملFitness and evolutionary stability in game theoretic models of finite populations.
We investigate two methods of measuring fitness in evolutionary games played among members of a finite population. Classical notions of stability account for the action of selection only, and use immediate reproductive gains as a measure of fitness. This classical interpretation of fitness is what we call reproductive fitness (RF), and is found in the early studies of evolutionary stability in ...
متن کاملDynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inh...
متن کاملEvolutionary Games with Affine Fitness Functions: Applications to Cancer
We analyze the dynamics of evolutionary games in which fitness is defined as an affine function of the expected payoff and a constant contribution. The resulting inhomogeneous replicator equation has an homogeneous equivalent with modified payoffs. The affine terms also influence the stochastic dynamics of a two-strategy Moran model of a finite population. We then apply the affine fitness funct...
متن کاملEvolutionary Games on Structured Populations under Weak Selection
All biological systems are, at some level, guided by the laws of natural selection and evolutionary dynamics. Adaptations with increased fitness tend to proliferate and fixate within populations. Those situations in which an individual’s fitness depends not only upon a static environment, but upon the fluctuating phenotypes of the surrounding population, fall within the domain of evolutionary g...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Dynamic Games and Applications
دوره 2 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012