Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
نویسندگان
چکیده
a Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands b WZB Social Science Center Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany c Technical University of Berlin, Faculty of Economics and Management, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany d University of Mannheim, Mannheim Business School, 68131 Mannheim, Germany e University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20148 Hamburg, Germany
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 84 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014