Slingshots and Boomerangs

A “slingshot” proof suggested by Kurt Gödel (1944) has been recast by Stephen Neale (1995) as a deductive argument showing that no non-truthfunctional sentence connective can permit the combined use, within its scope, of two truth-functionally valid inference principles involving definite descriptions. According to Neale, this result provides indirect support for Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and has broader philosophical repercussions because descriptions occur in non-truth-functional constructions used to motivate talk about (e.g.) necessity, time, probability, causation, obligation, facts, states of affairs, and propositions. We develop Neale’s claims and rebut Graham Oppy’s (1997) criticism of Neale. In particular, we (i) work out the details of several formal, philosophical, and historical points raised by Neale, Oppy, and Quine, (ii) explore the consequences of Gödel’s Slingshot for specific theories of facts, (iii) demonstrate the integrity of Gödel’s Slingshot and the claims Neale bases on it, and the falsity of all of Oppy’s main claims.