Evolution of Fairness and Punishment Markets
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چکیده
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منابع مشابه
Supporting Online Material for Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
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Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment.
Large-scale societies in which strangers regularly engage in mutually beneficial transactions are puzzling. The evolutionary mechanisms associated with kinship and reciprocity, which underpin much of primate sociality, do not readily extend to large unrelated groups. Theory suggests that the evolution of such societies may have required norms and institutions that sustain fairness in ephemeral ...
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J. HENRICH ET AL. (“Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment,” Research Articles, 19 March, p. 1480) have shown that market integration and participation in world religion covary with fairness. The authors suggest that their results support cultural evolution theories and contradict the hypothesis that successful social interactions in largescale societies...
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We study the co-evolutionary emergence of fairness preferences in the form of other-regarding behavior and its effect on the origination of costly punishment behavior in public good games. Our approach closely combines empirical results from three experiments with an evolutionary simulation model. In this way, we try to fill a gap between the evolutionary theoretical literature on cooperation a...
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We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental ...
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