Insurance companies’ point of view toward moral hazard incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
Moral hazards are the result of an expansive range of factors mostly originating in the patients' roles. The objective of the present study was to investigate patient incentives for moral hazards using the experiences of experts of basic Iranian insurance organizations. This was a qualitative research. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews. The study population included all experts of basic healthcare insurance agencies in the City of Isfahan, Iran, who were familiar with the topic of moral hazards. A total of 18 individuals were selected through purposive sampling and interviewed and some criteria such as data reliability and stability were considered. The anonymity of the interviewees was preserved. The data were transcribed, categorized, and then, analyzed through thematic analysis method. Through thematic analysis, 2 main themes and 11 subthemes were extracted. The main themes included economic causes and moral-cultural causes affecting the phenomenon of moral hazards resulted from patients' roles. Each of these themes has some sub-themes. False expectations from insurance companies are rooted in the moral and cultural values of individuals. People with the insurance coverage make no sense if using another person insurance identification or requesting physicians for prescribing the medicines. These expectations will lead them to moral hazards. Individuals with any insurance coverage should consider the rights of insurance agencies as third party payers and supportive organizations which disburden them from economical loads in the time of sickness.
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