How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods[Link]
نویسندگان
چکیده
A selfish (SE) seller is a homo oeconomicus according to standard theory – she simply maximises her own material pay-off. Thus, since the pay-off of the customer does not affect the seller’s utility, the indifference curves of a SE seller in (ps, pc) space are vertical. An efficiency loving (EL) expert is willing to give up own monetary pay-off to increase the material pay-off of her trading partner if the ‘price of giving’ is not too high. Thus, the indifference curves of an EL expert in (ps, pc) space are downward sloped
منابع مشابه
How Social Preferences Shape Incentives in (Experimental) Markets for Credence Goods.
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximising quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence indicates the opposite. We identify a lack of robustness with respect to heterogeneity in social preferences ...
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