On Complexity of Market Equilibria with Maximum Social Welfare
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the computational complexity of the Market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the number of equilibrium prices is #P-hard.
منابع مشابه
On the complexity of market equilibria with maximum social welfare
We consider the computational complexity of the market equilibrium problem by exploring the structural properties of the Leontief exchange economy. We prove that, for economies guaranteed to have a market equilibrium, finding one with maximum social welfare or maximum individual welfare is NP-hard. In addition, we prove that counting the number of equilibrium prices is #P-hard.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC)
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005