The E ect of False - name Declarations in Mechanism Design : New Fraud in Internet Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants, and obtain the following results. 1) We develop a formal model of this class of mechanism design problems and prove that the revelation principle for dominant strategies still holds in this model. 2) When false-name declarations are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto e cient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium. 3) We show a su cient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of participants). JEL classi cation: D44 Auctions EFFECT OF FALSE-NAME DECLARATIONS IN MECHANISM DESIGN 3
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