Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82
منابع مشابه
Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals. JEL classi cation: D44 ; D82 ; C69 Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions; Interdependent Values; Perturbation Analysis, Revenue Equivalence. School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 115 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004