Secession, Majority Rule and Equal Rights: a Few Questions
نویسنده
چکیده
How can one justify the secession of a territory from a liberal-democratic state of the kind currently prevalent in North America and Western Europe? The question does not primarily concern a mutually agreed secession, such as that of Norway from the United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden in 1905. If the government and legislature of the ‘parent state’ freely agree to a secession of a part of its territory, this provides at least a prima facie, albeit not necessarily the only, justification for the secession.
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