On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes

نویسندگان

  • Javed A. Aslam
  • Raluca A. Popa
  • Ronald L. Rivest
چکیده

We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes. Prior work in this field has emphasized the simpler case when all precincts have the same size. Using auditing methods developed for use with equal-sized precincts can, however, be inefficient or result in loss of statistical confidence when applied to elections with variable-sized precincts. We survey, evaluate, and compare a variety of approaches to the variable-sized precinct auditing problem, including the SAFE method [11] which is based on theory developed for equal-sized precincts. We introduce new methods such as the negative-exponential method “NEGEXP” that select precincts independently for auditing with predetermined probabilities, and the “PPEBWR” method that uses a sequence of rounds to select precincts with replacement according to some predetermined probability distribution that may depend on error bounds for each precinct (hence the name PPEBWR: probability proportional to error bounds, with replacement), where the error bounds may depend on the sizes of the precincts, or on how the votes were cast in each precinct. We give experimental results showing that NEGEXP and PPEBWR can dramatically reduce (by a factor or two or three) the cost of auditing compared to methods such as SAFE that depend on the use of uniform sampling. Sampling so that larger precincts are audited with appropriately larger probability can yield large reductions in expected number of votes counted in an audit. We also present the optimal auditing strategy, which is nicely representable as a linear programming problem but only efficiently computable for small elections (fewer than a dozen precincts). We conclude with some recommendations for practice.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Workload Estimates for Risk-Limiting Audits of Large Contests

We compare the expected number of ballots that must be counted by hand for two risk-limiting auditing methods, Canvass Audits by Sampling and Testing (CAST) and Kaplan-Markov (KM). The methods use different sampling designs to select batches of ballots to count by hand and different test statistics to decide when the audit can stop. The comparisons are based on the 2008 U.S. House of Representa...

متن کامل

Software Support for Software-Independent Auditing

Electronic voting machines have the potential to make the election process more efficient, but concerns over their reliability and security could undermine confidence in election results. The most effective way of verifying election results is by auditing physical copies of the ballots that have been verified by the voter. Since manually viewing every ballot is unrealistic, a variety of algorit...

متن کامل

Computing the Margin of Victory in IRV Elections

Efficient post-election audits select the number of machines or precincts to audit based in part on the margin of victory (the number of ballots that must be changed in order to change the outcome); a close election needs more auditing than a landslide victory. For a simple “first-pastthe-post” election, the margin is easily computed based on the number of votes the first and second place candi...

متن کامل

PART TWO 4 Extending King’s Ecological Inference Model to Multiple Elections Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo

King’s EI estimator has become a widely used procedure for tackling so-called ecological inference problems. The canonical ecological inference problem involves inferring the rate of voter turnout among two racial groups in a set of electoral precincts from observations on the racial composition and total voter turnout in each precinct. As a Bayesian hierarchical model, EI links information abo...

متن کامل

Effective audit policy for voter-verified paper ballots in New Jersey

Scientists and politicians are reaching consensus that elections must be countable independently of the need to trust any particular computer software, whether that software is in a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine or in an optical scanner. Public trust in elections requires a Voter-Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB), either a voter-viewable printout from a DRE machine or (even better...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008