Reciprocity in Manager-Subordinate Relationships: Components, Configurations, and Outcomes

The present study examines both positive and negative norms of reciprocity in managerial work relationships by assessing three components of reciprocal behavior: immediacy, equivalence, and interest motive. The findings show that subordinate reports of immediacy, equivalence, and self-interest were negatively associated, and mutual-interest was positively associated, with relationship quality as reported by both subordinates and managers (other-interest was not significant). These components of reciprocity were also subjected to cluster analysis to identify groupings of reciprocity styles. The results indicate styles reflecting high quality (n = 65), low quality (n = 120), and negative social exchanges (n = 23). Analyses addressing reciprocity configurations and work outcomes showed that the higher quality exchange relationships had higher levels of perceived organizational support and altruism (but not commitment) than the lower and negative exchange groups, while only the negative reciprocity group showed lower levels of performance and conscientiousness as rated by the manager. Since the early groundbreaking work on reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958; Levi-Strauss, 1957; Malinowski, 1922; Simmel, 1950) a vast number of studies have been conducted examining reciprocity in a variety of fields, showing strong support for the role of reciprocity in relationship development and maintenance. Although the diversity of applications clearly demonstrates that reciprocity is well recognized in the academic literature, seemingly little empirical work has been conducted on reciprocity in manager-subordinate relationships (Set512 Uh l-Bi e n & Ma s l y n i n Jo u r n a l o f Ma n a g e M e n t 29 (2003) toon, Bennett & Liden, 1996; Sparrowe, 1998). This is surprising given the importance of reciprocity within managerial relationships (Liden, Sparrowe & Wayne, 1997; Rousseau, 1998; Uhl-Bien, Graen & Scandura, 2000). As noted by Liden et al. (1997) in reference to Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory: “it is remarkable how few studies have directly examined exchange processes between leaders and members given the theoretical centrality of social exchange processes in the formation of LMX relationships” (p. 75). The present study addresses this gap by investigating subordinate perceptions of reciprocity in manager-subordinate work relationships. Using classic reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958; Malinowski, 1922; Sahlins, 1972) and LeaderMember Exchange (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991, 1995; Liden et al., 1997; Uhl-Bien et al., 2000) literatures, we develop hypotheses examining reciprocity in managersubordinate relationships and how it relates to outcomes, considering both positive and negative norms of reciprocity. First we examine components of reciprocity individually to see how they relate to dyad members’ perceptions of relationship quality. We then examine the reciprocity components in combination, using a configurational approach (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993). Configurations are identified using cluster analysis, and then examined relative to important organizational outcomes. Reciprocity in Manager-Subordinate Work Relationships Reciprocity addresses the processes governing social interaction among individuals, the “pattern of exchange through which the mutual dependence of people, brought about by the division of labor, is realized” (Gouldner, 1960: 169–170). Its importance to social systems is reflected in descriptions of reciprocity as “the vital principle of society” (Thurnwald, 1932: 106) and a “key intervening variable through which shared social rules are enabled to yield social stability” (Gouldner, 1960: 161). According to Gouldner (1960), the fundamental principles of reciprocity lie in the imbedded obligations created by exchanges of benefits or favors among individuals. This concept, which he termed the ‘generalized norm of reciprocity,’ evokes obligations toward others on the basis of past behaviors: “... when one party benefits another, an obligation is generated. The recipient is now indebted to the donor, and he remains so until he repays” (1960: 174). This norm serves as a stabilizing function as well as a “starting mechanism” in that it helps initiate social interaction and create social structure in the form of status duties (Gouldner, 1960). Gouldner (1960) notes that the norm of reciprocity can be understood by examining different elements or components of the process, including equivalence (the extent to which the amount of return is roughly equivalent to what was received), immediacy (the time period between receipt of an exchange and repayment, when commitments have been made creating an obligation yet to be fulfilled), and interest (the motive of the dyad partner in making the exchange, e.g., self-interest, mutual-interest, and other-interest). In combination, these elements of reciprocity are said to provide the mechanisms through which the stability of social systems is maintained (Homans, 1958; Liden et al., 1997; Simmel, 1950; Thurnwald, 1932). Gouldner (1960) also raised the question of whether there exists a negative norm of reciprocity, or “sentiments of retaliation where the emphasis is placed Re c i p R o c i t y i n Ma n a g e R-sU B o R d i n a t e Re l a t i o n s h i p s 513 not on the return of benefits but on the return of injuries” (p. 172). According to Gouldner (1960), historically the most important form of “homeomorphic” reciprocity, or that in which exchanges are concretely alike with respect to things exchanged or circumstances in which they are exchanged, is found in negative norms of reciprocity. From a sociological perspective, a negative norm of reciprocity represents the means by which individuals act against wrongs, and functions to keep balance in social systems. Considering both positive and negative norms, therefore, captures the range of reciprocity that occurs in social exchanges. In the literature on managerial relationships, Liden et al. (1997) propose that positive and negative norms of reciprocity in manager-subordinate exchanges operate along a continuum, ranging from negative reciprocity (where there may be an exchange of injuries), to balanced reciprocity (a positive norm which includes low and high quality LMX relationships), to generalized reciprocity (the most positively developed form of reciprocity). Moreover, they suggest that negative reciprocity is not low quality LMX, which is typically described as void of trust, respect, and loyalty, but rather lies outside traditional conceptualizations of LMX relationships. According to Liden et al. (1997), research is needed to investigate both positive and negative norms of reciprocity in work relationships. To address these issues, we examine next how equivalence, immediacy, and interest function relative to positive and negative reciprocity norms in managerial relationships. Positive Norms of Reciprocity in Managerial Relationships As described earlier, a positive norm of reciprocity involves indebtedness that results from exchanges among individuals (Gouldner, 1960). In contrast to negative reciprocity, which involves an exchange of injuries, positive reciprocity norms involve an exchange of benefits, with some relationships involving greater exchange of benefits than others. The characteristics of this indebtedness will vary from relationship to relationship, depending on the functioning of the basic elements of reciprocity, including equivalence, immediacy, and interest. Equivalence. Equivalence is the extent to which the amount of return is roughly equivalent to what has been received. According to Malinowski (1922), reciprocity is an exchange of equivalent services that in the long run balance, benefiting both sides equally. Similarly, Homans (1958) suggested “a certain proportionality between the values to others of the behavior a man gives them and the value to him of the behavior they give him” (pp. 599–600). The issue of equivalence in managerial exchanges has been discussed in the LMX literature. According to Uhl-Bien et al. (2000), as relationships mature from lower to higher quality, individuals move out of “active testing” processes of reciprocity, i.e., they cease keeping score and worrying about whether they are paid back and focus instead on mutual concerns without concern for equivalent or immediate payback. Similarly, Liden et al. (1997; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997; Sparrowe, 1998) predicted that the amount of equivalence in managerial exchanges would vary with relationship quality. Specifically, they proposed that higher quality relationships will have lower equivalence, such that what is exchanged is of greater or lesser value than what was originally received. Lower quality relationships will have higher equivalence in which the item(s) exchanged are of approximately equal value. In other words, individuals who trust and respect one 514 Uh l-Bi e n & Ma s l y n i n Jo u r n a l o f Ma n a g e M e n t 29 (2003) another and are committed to the relationship will not be concerned about making sure that their exchanges are of equal value to remain “in balance” in terms of reciprocity, while individuals in lower quality exchanges will watch to make sure that what they receive back is equivalent relative to what they gave. Therefore, we can hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1a: Manager-subordinate relationship quality (i.e., LMX) will be negatively related to equivalence. Immediacy. A second element in the reciprocity literature involves the amount of time between exchanges. Gouldner (1960) described this as the period when there is an obligation still to be performed, when obligations that have been incurred by an exchange are yet to be fulfilled. Malinowski (1922), in investigating tribal groups, observed that gifts are not immediately returned, and repayment may take as long as a year. Mauss (1950) also discussed gift exchanges as indeterminate in time noting that while reciprocation cannot wait forever, gifts should also not be reciprocated immediately. Sahlins (1972) used the term immediacy to describe the amount of time between the receipt of material or non-material goods from an exchange partner and when reciprocation occurs. This term, also adopted by Sparrowe and Liden (1997) for their model of managerial work relationships, involves time periods ranging from instantaneous (i.e., high immediacy) to an indefinite amount of time (i.e., low immediacy). Similar to the arguments for equivalence, Sparrowe and Liden (1997) argued that as relationship quality improves, immediacy will move from higher to lower, with individuals becoming more trusting and less concerned with when an exchange is reciprocated. This is also consistent with Graen and Uhl-Bien’s (1991, 1995) time span of reciprocity, where early in managerial relationship development, the time span of reciprocity will be shorter. As individuals begin to build trust in one another more, the time span of reciprocation becomes longer. By the time the relationship reaches high quality, concern about time span of reciprocation becomes much less important. Hypothesis 1b: Manager-subordinate relationship quality (i.e., LMX) will be negatively related to immediacy. Interest. A third component of reciprocity involves the interest motive of the dyad partners (Liden et al., 1997; Sahlins, 1972). According to Liden et al. (1997), as relationship quality increases, interest will move from a focus on self-interest to a focus on mutual-interest, where the two parties of the exchange strive to obtain mutual benefits. In the highest quality relationships, the interest focus is on other member of the relationship, reflected by an unselfish devotion and deep concern for the other. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1991, 1995) agree with this conceptualization, but limit the range the interest motive can take in reciprocal relationships as extending from self-interest to mutual-interest. According to these authors, the highest level of relationship quality would be characterized by a high level of mutual-interest in which each party acts in the best interests of the relationship. While Liden et al. (1997) suggested that other-interest based relationships would occur, they also noted they would be relatively rare in leader-member Re c i p R o c i t y i n Ma n a g e R-sU B o R d i n a t e Re l a t i o n s h i p s 515 work relationships. Since the focus of this research is on manager-subordinate dyads operating in business relationships, we believe that we will not find a pure other-interest focus in higher quality relationships. Similar to the dual-concern model discussed in the leadership and conflict management literatures where concern for one party’s interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive of a concerns for the other party’s interests (Blake & Mouton, 1964), we propose that individuals can engage in reciprocal relationships with more than one motive. That is, individuals can be both self-interested and mutually interested or mutually interested and other-interested. Therefore, if an other-interest motive is found in work-based relationships, we believe that individuals will have other-interest but it will exist in combination with mutual concern (Batson, 1993). Hypothesis 1c: Manager-subordinate relationship quality (i.e., LMX) will be negatively related to self-interest and positively related to mutualand other-interest. Reciprocity Components Combined While examination of each of the reciprocity components individually is important, to provide a complete picture of reciprocity in work relationships, we need to also examine the components in combination (Liden et al., 1997). We are aware of only one study that has been conducted in this way. Sparrowe (1998) collected data using scenarios reflecting three different levels of reciprocity, with descriptions consistent with the alignments of the reciprocity continuum modeled by Sparrowe and Liden (1997). In so doing, he adopted a configurational approach—combining the equivalence, immediacy and interest components to create a whole representation of reciprocal behavior. Partial support for his hypotheses was found, with the relationship between reciprocity and informal social structure most evident near the ends of the reciprocity continuum but less so at the center. Though this conceptualization of reciprocity is a step forward in understanding leadermember relationships, Sparrowe’s (1998) methodology presupposed that each form of reciprocity consists of the matching level of immediacy, equivalence and interest depicted in the model. We do not know, however, whether configurations of reciprocity styles will naturally form according to this model or another model. Therefore, we also examine whether patterns of immediacy, equivalence and interest, when allowed to combine themselves, will support the predictions proposed above. Drawing from both Liden et al. (1997) and Graen and Uhl-Bien (1991, 1995), we propose that alignments of reciprocity will form for different types of managersubordinate exchanges as predicted below (e.g., lower quality and higher quality reciprocity styles). Hypothesis 2a: Reciprocity in higher quality manager-subordinate relationships will be characterized by low immediacy, low equivalence, and high mutualand other-interest (and low self-interest). Hypothesis 2b: Reciprocity in lower quality manager-subordinate relationships will be characterized by high immediacy, high equivalence, and high self-interest (and low mutualand other-interest). 516 Uh l-Bi e n & Ma s l y n i n Jo u r n a l o f Ma n a g e M e n t 29 (2003) Negative Norms of Reciprocity in Managerial Relationships In addition to positive norms of reciprocity, it is possible that negative norms of reciprocity may exist in manager-subordinate exchanges. As mentioned earlier, Liden et al. (1997) proposed a more negative relationship than currently captured by outgroup exchanges. Uhl-Bien et al. (2000) also raised the possibility of negative or dysfunctional leader-member relationships in which “members would display disrespect, severely restrained communication, lack of understanding or even misunderstanding of the other, non-supportiveness, and no commitment to one another or the relationship (i.e., at moderate levels this would be a competitor; at extreme levels, an enemy)” (p. 150). Evidence of the possibility of negative reciprocity in managerial relationships can be found in the work on abusive supervision. This work, which evolved from earlier related constructs such as petty tyranny (Ashforth, 1997), inconsiderate or coercive behavior (Bies, 2000), non-physical workplace aggression (Neuman & Baron, 1997), and deviant organizational behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), describes abusive supervision as “the sustained display of hostile verbal and non-verbal behaviors, excluding physical contact” (Tepper, 2000: 178). These behaviors reflect indifference, willed hostility, and oftentimes deviance (Tepper, 2000). While not discussed in terms of reciprocity, it follows that if managers are involved in providing negative behaviors to subordinates, subordinates are likely to exchange negative behaviors in return (hence negative reciprocity, Gouldner, 1960). Relative to the reciprocity components, these relationships would obviously consist of higher self-interest as opposed to mutual-or other-interest (Liden et al., 1997). Moreover, while the literature suggests that negative reciprocity would be characterized by high equivalence (Gouldner, 1960; Liden et al., 1997), we believe that this prediction may not be appropriate for managerial relationships due to the nature of power/status differences inherent in these relationships. In particular, high equivalence would mean that when a manager provides an abusive behavior, the subordinate would reciprocate in turn with an abusive behavior. Interestingly, however, the literature on abusive supervision does not suggest this to be the case. Rather, abusive relationships are said to provide stress to subordinates, in part because of the helplessness they feel in not being able to respond due to fear of additional negative consequences (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 1998; Keashly, Trott, & McLean, 1994; Tepper, 2000). In particular, Ashforth (1997) found that abusive supervisory behavior was positively related to frustration, stress, reactance, helplessness, and work alienation, and negatively related to leader endorsement, self-esteem, work unit cohesiveness, and performance for subordinates. Therefore, we suggest that a negative norm of reciprocity may exist in some managersubordinate relationships. Given the harmful nature of these types of relationships, we do not expect them to be commonplace; however, we could expect that some will be found. These relationships would be characterized by an exchange of injuries, and the interest motive would be self-interest (versus mutual-or other-interested). Moreover, due to power differentials in managerial relationships, we do not expect these to have high equivalence or immediacy, since subordinates are restricted in the amount of negative exchanges they can make with managers without being fired. Based on this, we hypothesize that: Re c i p R o c i t y i n Ma n a g e R-sU B o R d i n a t e Re l a t i o n s h i p s 517 Hypothesis 3: Negative reciprocity in manager-subordinate relationships will be characterized by exchange of injuries, self-interest, low mutual-and other-interest, and low equivalence and immediacy. Reciprocity and Outcomes Finally, using the discussion above, we can also examine how types of reciprocity in manager-subordinate relationships will relate to organizational outcomes. When considered relative to the types of outcomes being discussed, e.g., job performance versus attitudinal, a component that may prove influential in identifying patterns of associations between reciprocity and outcomes is interest motive, or the extent to which reciprocity is driven by self-interest versus mutualor other-interest. Organ (1990) argues it is unreasonable to expect that individuals will intentionally engage in behaviors that compromise their own self-interests—such as purposefully reducing their individual performance records. Such behavior would affect their employability in the future and cause intrinsic pain from deliberately producing shoddy workmanship. Rather than engaging in behaviors that reflect negatively on performance, he argues that individuals will retain a self-interest focus and continue to engage in behaviors that personally benefit them, such as performance. We believe that for employees in lower quality relationships (note—not negative reciprocity) this self-interest focus will also apply to being conscientious about performing job duties, since this is directly related to managers’ assessments of job performance. In other words, we could expect that concern for self-interest by subordinates in lower quality relationships means they will not differ from subordinates in higher quality relationships on outcomes directly related to their performance records, such as performance and conscientiousness (Organ, 1990). If individuals are not fully committed or are dissatisfied, however, Organ (1990) suggests that what they will withdraw are positive discretionary behaviors, such as those that benefit others or the organization, e.g., altruism. Oftentimes such a focus is accompanied by the feeling that the organization is not as supportive as they would like (Settoon et al., 1996). Therefore, we could also expect that individuals in lower quality relationships characterized by self-interest will be significantly lower on work attitudes, such as commitment and perceived organizational support (POS), and helping behaviors than individuals in higher quality exchanges with a mutual-interest focus, which would be accompanied by greater concern for others and discretionary behaviors. This would be consistent with research showing that individuals react best in terms of job attitudes when they work under a combination of economic and social exchanges (Tsui, Pearce, Porter & Tripoli, 1997). Although we do not make a prediction about a non-significant relationship, we also suggest that subordinates in lower quality relationships will not differ from subordinates in higher quality relationships on performance and conscientiousness. Hypothesis 4: Subordinates in exchanges characterized by mutually-interested reciprocity will show significantly higher commitment, POS, and altruism than subordinates in exchanges characterized by self-interested reciprocity. As mentioned earlier, negative reciprocity is defined as embattled relationships characterized by self-interest, sabotage, and hatred, in which each party extracts 518 Uh l-Bi e n & Ma s l y n i n Jo u r n a l o f Ma n a g e M e n t 29 (2003) the minimum necessary from the other and acts to thwart the other’s goals (Liden et al., 1997). Negative reciprocity is highly dysfunctional, leading us to expect that they will be negatively associated with desirable behavioral outcomes (Duffy et al., 1998; Tepper, 2000). In particular, considering the types of relationships described above, we would expect subordinates in relationships characterized by negative reciprocity to have lower performance, conscientiousness, and altruism than those in the other types of relationships (Keashly et al., 1994). We would also expect them to report lower organizational commitment and perceived organizational support than those in lower or higher quality manager-subordinate relationships (Duffy & Ferrier, in press). Hypothesis 5: Subordinates in manager-subordinate exchanges characterized by negative reciprocity will show significantly lower scores on performance, conscientiousness, organizational commitment, perceived organizational support, and altruism than subordinates in exchanges not characterized by negative reciprocity. In that this differs somewhat from past research, we believe it provides an important clarification to the LMX literature. We suggest that some of the inconsistency in the findings on performance and LMX (Vecchio & Gobdel, 1984) may be due to lack of distinction between negative reciprocity and lower quality exchange. In other words, consistent with Liden et al. (1997) we believe the introduction of negative reciprocity to LMX may help identify truly dysfunctional relationships from lower quality relationships based on positive norms of reciprocity. We also suggest the need for theorizing to distinguish between more non-discretionary performance-related outcomes (“I must do it to maintain my employment”) and more discretionary outcomes (“I can choose to withdraw this behavior and still keep my job”).