The Good Qualitative Researcher

This paper discusses what it means to be a good qualitative researcher. The aim is to deliberately blur the distinction between epistemic and ethical goodness by arguing that there is a close connection between being a good qualitative researcher in the epistemic and the ethical senses. First, the relation between researcher and researched is articulated as a power relation giving rise to certain ethical demands. Second, some similarities between the discourses on ethics and qualitative research are brought forth, and it is argued that the key qualifications that enable qualitative researchers to deal well with their subject matter are irreducible moral virtues. Finally, a relevant objection is considered: By blurring the distinction between science and ethics in qualitative research, do I not commit an “ethicist” fallacy that portrays qualitative research as automatically liberating, progressive, and inherently ethical? In what follows I shall discuss what it means to be a good qualitative researcher. The word ‘good’, of course, is ambiguous. It can refer either to goodness in producing knowledge (this I call “epistemic goodness”) or it can refer to ethical goodness. My aim is to deliberately blur the distinction between epistemic and ethical goodness. I shall argue that it is often futile to separate the epistemic and the ethical domains when it comes to qualitative research. I propose that there is a close connection between being a good qualitative researcher in the epistemic and the ethical senses. I do not mean to say that successful qualitative researchers are all angels or moral saints, but I do believe that they possess some skills that are also involved in ethical perception, judgment and reasoning. I want to raise the question whether, when we talk about good qualitative research, it makes sense to do so without including the ethical dimensions of goodness. The discussion is structured in three parts: First, I discuss the relation between researcher and researched as a power relation. This has recently become a commonplace in much qualitative literature, but it is often overlooked that power and ethics logically and psychologically presuppose one another. We cannot understand what ethics is without knowing something about power, and vice versa. Second, I bring forth some similarities between the discourses on ethics and qualitative research. The subject matter of ethics consists of phenomena that are practical, vague and uncertain, normative, qualitative and particular. The phenomena that qualitative research deals with can likewise be said to be practical (i.e. situated in practical contexts of life as lived), often vague rather than distinct, normative (or intentional), and also qualitative and particular. I argue that the key qualifications that enable qualitative researchers to deal well with their subject matter are irreducible moral virtues, and I also discuss the notions of objectivity and validity as ethical-cum-epistemic values. Finally, I consider a relevant objection to my perspective: By blurring the distinction between science and ethics in qualitative research, do I not commit an “ethicist” fallacy that portrays qualitative research as automatically liberating, progressive, and inherently ethical?