Handling Declared Information Leakage
نویسنده
چکیده
We address the problem of controlling information leakage in a concurrent declarative programming setting. Our aim is to define formal tools in order to distinguish between authorized, or declared, information flows such as password testing (e.g., ATM, login processes, etc.) and non-authorized ones. We propose to define security policies as rewriting systems. Such policies define how the privacy levels of information evolve. A formal definition of secure processes with respect to a given security policy is given.
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