Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Di erentiated Experts
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines the e ectiveness of cheap talk advice in recurrent relationships between a customer, and multiple experts who provide professional services with di erentiated specialties. Speci cally, the sustainable honesty level is characterized in relation to the degree of rivalry among the experts. The three main ndings are: 1) Fully honest advice may not be sustained if the pro tability of service provision varies widely across problems. 2) As the number of experts increases due to a higher degree of specialization, the maximum equilibrium honesty level deteriorates. 3) Nonetheless, the equilibria that pass a certain credibility check on their punishment phases, implement the same (unique) honesty level regardless of the number of experts. Furthermore, the customer can extract this honesty level by appointing a \panel" of only one or two (but no more) experts and \trusting" them all the time. JEL Classi cation Numbers: D82
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