Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider Kyle’s market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally distributed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D82, G14.
منابع مشابه
A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle- Model
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