Does Marilyn Know her Game Theory?
نویسنده
چکیده
“Say you’re in a public library, and a beautiful stranger strikes up a conversation with you. She says: ‘Let’s show pennies to each other, either heads or tails. If we both show heads, I pay you $3. If we both show tails, I pay you $1. If they don’t match, you pay me $2.’ At this point, she is shushed. You think: ‘With both heads 1/4 of the time, I get $3. And with both tails 1/4 of the time, I get $1. So 1/2 of the time, I get $4. And with no matches 1/2 of the time, she gets $4. So it’s a fair game.’ As the game is quiet, you can play in the library. But should you? Should she?— Edward Spellman, Cheshire, Connecticut.
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