Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction
نویسندگان
چکیده
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. Department of Economics University of Bonn D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 Fax: +49(0228)739221 *University of Bonn, Department of Economics, BWL II, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, Email: [email protected] **Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics, Guoding Road 777, 200433 Shanghai, China, Email: [email protected] ***Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany, Email: [email protected]
منابع مشابه
The impact of horizontal mergers and acquisitions in price competition models
The question of what impact mergers and acquisitions have on key equilibrium performance measures is fundamental to our understanding of competitive dynamics in an oligopolistic industry. We address these questions in the context of price competition models with differentiated goods and asymmetric firms allowing for general non-linear demand and cost functions merely assuming that both the prea...
متن کاملHorizontal mergers with free entry
We consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit. In contrast to much of the previous literature on horizontal mergers, our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable: with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial (even under quantity competition), there is no “free rider problem” in that ins...
متن کاملEquilibrium Price Dispersion, Mergers and Synergies: An Experimental Investigation of Differentiated Product Competition
This paper reports an experiment conducted to examine market performance and mergers in an asymmetric differentiated product oligopoly. We find that static Nash predictions organize mean market outcomes reasonably well. Markets on average respond to horizontal mergers with price increases as predicted and marginal cost synergies exert the predicted the power-mitigating price effects. Nash predi...
متن کاملSwitching Costs and the Timing of Merger-Induced Price Changes
This paper formalizes a non-cooperative explanation for pre-merger price increases. When consumers face switching costs, firms have strong incentives to offer bargain prices to lock in consumers whom they can exploit in the future. A future merger reduces a firm’s incentive to gain current market share, however, because the firm anticipates sharing future profits. Focusing on near-term profit, ...
متن کاملThe Competitive Effects of Mergers Between Asymmetric Firms
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggest that the merger of two relatively weak competitors may result in a strong competitor and may lead to lower prices, despite the resulting increase in concentration. This paper introduces incomplete information into a simple model of repeated competition among firms that are asymmetric in their likely degree of efficiency at each stage of competition....
متن کامل