A Necessary and sufficient Condition for convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.
منابع مشابه
On characterizing quantum correlated equilibria
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some quantitative questions for general games of growing sizes [Zha10]. However, one fundamental question that the paper did not consider is the characterization of qu...
متن کاملLearning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium
The paper studies a large class of bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models on strategic-form games. The main assumption is that players ‘‘recognize’’ cyclic patterns in the observed history of play. The main result is convergence with probability one to a fixed pattern of pure strategy Nash equilibria, in a large class of ‘‘simple games’’ in which the pure equilibria are nicely sprea...
متن کاملAn Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-strategy Equilibria*
One of the more convincing interpretations of mixed strategy equilibria describes a mixed equilibrium as a steady state in a large population in which all players use pure strategies but the population as a whole mimics a mixed strategy. To be complete, however, this interpretation requires a good story about how the population arrives at the appropriate distribution over pure strategies. In th...
متن کاملON CONVERGENCE THEOREMS FOR FUZZY HENSTOCK INTEGRALS
The main purpose of this paper is to establish different types of convergence theorems for fuzzy Henstock integrable functions, introduced by Wu and Gong cite{wu:hiff}. In fact, we have proved fuzzy uniform convergence theorem, convergence theorem for fuzzy uniform Henstock integrable functions and fuzzy monotone convergence theorem. Finally, a necessary and sufficient condition under which th...
متن کاملSingle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
First Draft: August 1996; This Draft: March, 1999 Abstract: This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first-price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games were each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The previous lit...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IGTR
دوره 11 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009