Monopoly Quality Differentiation with Top-quality Dependent Fixed Costs
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper extends the standard monopoly quality differentiation model by Mussa and Rosen (1978) to an environment where the production of a (qualitydifferentiated) product-line involves initial fixed investments in common assets such as production facilities or R&D. The fixed cost depends solely on the level of the highest quality, and the invested asset is shared among all the qualities in the product-line. The presence of top-quality dependent fixed costs always leads to a pooling of some high-type customers. By contrast with the standard model, all consumer types (including the highest type) experience quality distortion, and the firm may reduce the quality range relative to the efficient one.
منابع مشابه
Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly.
This paper analyzes the optimal structure of a regulated health care industry in a model in which the regulator cannot enforce what hospitals do (unverifiable quality of health) or does not know what hospitals know (incomplete information about production costs) or both. We show that if quality is unverifiable the choice between monopoly and duopoly does not change with respect to the verifiabl...
متن کاملMonopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality
I show that Swan’s (1970) independence result requires a multiplicative interaction between durability and all other quality attributes. Because there is no compelling argument for a multiplicativity in quality, monopolists tend to distort durability, even with constant marginal costs. Distortions in durability and other quality aspects are aligned exactly when the marginal cost of quality do n...
متن کاملForthcoming in The Journal of Banking and Finance
Two financial services firms (FSFs) produce information on future returns from risky assets, incorporate this information in a report and sell the reports to investors. The FSFs make strategic choices of the quality, differentiation and prices of their reports. Their optimal strategic choices of quality and differentiation divide the market for the report into three segments. Each FSF has a mon...
متن کاملVertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities
We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategi...
متن کاملQuality Choice, Fixed Costs and Equilibrium in Models of Vertical Differentiation
I provide a full characterization of the quality choice in duopolies with vertical differentiation, without assuming ex-ante if the market is fully covered or not. This will allow to show that covered or uncovered market configurations are endogenous outcomes of firms’ strategic interaction. To this purpose, I assume that firms are characterized by quadratic fixed costs of quality improvements ...
متن کامل