Strategic Delegation in an Experimental Mixed Duopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide the first test of the consequences of delegation in a mixed duopoly. Such delegation allows a profit maximizing private owner and a welfare maximizing public owner to give a separate weight to sales in managerial contracts. Theory predicts that such contracts improve welfare. Our experimental evidence indicates that both public and private owners do provide a weight on sales consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium. Critically, however, this is only true when playing with a robot manager and when playing with a human subject manger after the experience of playing with a robot manager.
منابع مشابه
Endogenous choice of strategic incentives in a mixed duopoly with a new managerial delegation contract for the public firm ¬リニ
Article history: Received 26 March 2014 Received in revised form 11 October 2014 Accepted 14 October 2014 Available online 24 October 2014 This paper revisits the endogenous choice problemof the strategic contracts in amixed duopoly of one public firm and one managerial private firm, with differentiated goods. This paper considers the situation wherein the separation between ownership and manag...
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