Violence in Iraq : the impact of public debate during wartime

Does public debate about the pros and cons of the UK's involvement in Iraq undermine the chances of military success? Radha Iyengar examines the incentives of Iraqi insurgent groups to commit acts of violence, their responses to public opinion in the West, and the lessons for both communications policy and counter-insurgency strategy. T he Chilcot inquiry into the UK's involvement in Iraq between 2001 and 2009 is unique in its breadth of coverage: from the evidence available in the public domain for entering the conflict and the subsequent military action to the political and social aftermath, both in Iraq and at home. A central question is whether information to justify the UK's involvement was withheld or presented to the public in a misleading way. Of potentially equal significance is the fact that the Iraq inquiry is available live via the internet and satellite television. A concern commonly cited across many similar conflicts is the extent to which such open debate in democracies can reduce the chances of a successful military outcome. Is it possible that public debate over the progress and plans for war may be sending information to opponents in conflict areas that may undermine the chances of military success by damaging the credibility of a nation's long-term commitment to persist until victory? This concern is amplified in insurgent conflicts, in which guerrilla tactics are used to try to overthrow an incumbent government. Studies by conflict experts James Fearon and David Laitin have shown that insurgent groups operate using political as well as military techniques. These seek to 'delegitimise' the existing government. This is typically accomplished through the use of violence, which makes it difficult for existing political parties to govern effectively and maintain public support (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Such insurgencies tend to result in protracted conflicts with neither insurgent nor counter-insurgent forces achieving a decisive victory. As Eisenstadt and White (2005) show, the average duration of insurgencies in the twentieth century is approximately nine years, with about half resulting in success for the government. This gives time for insurgent forces to disseminate alternative political scenarios and win over the civilian population whose government they are attempting to overturn. Concerns about domestic debate