Evolution , Learning , and Economic Behavior
نویسنده
چکیده
It is doubtful whether I shall be able to meet the high standards set by previous speakers. I shall not prove deep theorems. I shall not present astonishing new results. Instead of this I shall try to catch your attention by a fictitious dialogue. I shall employ the help of imaginary discussants like the “Bayesian” or the “experimentalist.” A “chairman” will determine who speaks next, but he shall also make his own remarks. Chairman: I open the discussion with a question: What do we know about the structure of human economic behavior? One of our participants, the Bayesian, has signalled his willingness to answer this question. I give the floor to the Bayesian. Bayesian: As far as economic activities are concerned, it is justified to assume that man is a rational being. Since Savage (1954) simultaneously axiomatized utility and subjective probability we know what rational economic behavior is. Rational economic behavior is the maximization of subjectively expected utility. Chairman: Among us is an economist. I would like to ask him whether this is the agreed upon opinion in economic theory. Economist: Yes, to a large extent this is the agreed upon opinion. Most
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