Re-entitlement E¤ects with Duration Dependent Unemployment Insurance in a Stochastic Matching Equilibrium
نویسنده
چکیده
In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework, this paper considers how a duration dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system affects the dynamics of unemployment and wages in an economy subject to stochastic job-destruction shocks. It establishes that re-entitlement e¤ects induced by a nite duration UI program generate intertemporal transfers from rms that hire in future booms to rms that hire in current recessions. These transfers imply a net hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilizes unemployment levels
منابع مشابه
Re-entitlement effects with duration-dependent unemployment insurance in a stochastic matching equilibrium
In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework, this paper considers how a duration-dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system affects the dynamics of unemployment and wages in an economy subject to stochastic job-destruction shocks. It establishes that re-entitlement effects induced by a finite duration UI program generate intertemporal transfers from firms that hire in future b...
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