Origin Disturbances in BGP
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper develops an empirical profile of BGP prefix announcements that originate from multiple ASes, so-called MOAS announcements. Analysis of Oregon RouteViews data over one year shows that a small fraction of prefixes are responsible for a very large fraction of all origin AS transitions observed at RouteViews. Moreover, these heavy-hitter prefixes oscillated between two origin ASes. The prevalence of this behavior indicates that a clear profile of its characteristics will inform a larger understanding of MOASes and ultimately BGP. The central contribution of this paper is a detailed analysis of these MOAS multihoming oscillations at different time scales. We empirically derive a model of AS disturbance periods during which the origin AS observed oscillates with heavy tailed holding times. We demonstrate that these disturbances arrive according to a Poisson process. We also show that the update stream within these disturbances exhibits long range dependence. Using simulations, and physical-based modeling of events at origin to drive these simulations, we demonstrate that heavy-tailed oscillation at the origin is a possible explanation for our observations (while the complex interplay of the BGP protocol and network topology is not such an explanation). Comparison with BGP beacon data verifies our simulations that discrete and singular events at the origin do not generate heavy-tailed oscillations at the viewpoint. In sum, we find that AS oscillations driven by heavy-tailed oscillations between different multihomed providers are a widespread and important BGP phenomenon with complex but recognizable signatures such as heavy-tailed holding times and longrange dependence.
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