Crowdfunding, Cascades and Informed Investors

نویسنده

  • Simon C. Parker
چکیده

Crowdfunding, Cascades and Informed Investors Do higher proportions of (a) informed investors and (b) high-quality projects increase the number of good projects that are ultimately financed via crowdfunding? A simple model and simulation reveals the answers to both questions to be: ‘not necessarily’. JEL Classification: L26, C63, G23

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تاریخ انتشار 2014