Quantum repeated games
نویسنده
چکیده
In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners’ dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2002