A Note on Nash Bargaining with On-the-job Search
نویسنده
چکیده
where E(w) is the value of the worker if matched at a wage w, J(w) is the value of the firm if matched at that wage, U is the worker’s threat point (unemployment) and V is the firm’s threat point (vacancy). If the derivative of E and J with respect to w is the same, as is the case in many search models without on-the-job search and with risk-neutral workers, then maximization of the Nash product leads to the first order condition
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How much do Workers Search ?
In this paper, I consider four determinants of wages: productivity, workers’ bargaining power, competition between employers due to on-the-job search, and search intensity by workers. Workers can increase their job offer arrival rate through costly search. Employers take into consideration the search intensity choices of their employees when the two parties jointly set wages. Using a Nash barga...
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We look at the impact of a binding minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare distributions in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search. We use two different specifications of the Nash bargaining problem. In one, firms engage in a Bertrand competition for the services of an individual, as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In the other, f...
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