Electoral Systems for Divided Societies
نویسنده
چکیده
What kinds of electoral systems can help democracy survive in countries split by deep cleavages of race, religion, language, or ethnicity? As is well-known, politicians in such “divided societies” often have strong incentives to “play the ethnic card” at election time, using communal appeals to mobilize voters. “Outbidding”—increasingly extreme rhetoric and demands—can offer rewards greater than those of moderation. In such circumstances, politics can quickly turn centrifugal, as the center is pulled apart by extremist forces and “winner-take-all” rules the day. The failure of democracy is often the result. Any strategy for building sustainable democracy in divided societies must place a premium on avoiding this depressingly familiar pattern and must instead find ways to promote interethnic accommodation, multiethnic political parties, and moderate, centrist politics. Because elections help shape broader norms of political behavior, scholars and practitioners alike agree that electoral systems can play a powerful role in promoting both democracy and successful conflict management. For example, by changing the incentives and payoffs available to political actors in their search for electoral victory, astutely crafted electoral rules can make some types of behavior more politically rewarding than others. Over the past two decades, such “electoral engineering” has become increasingly attractive for those attempting to build democracy in divided societies. While political scientists agree broadly that electoral systems do much Benjamin Reilly is a research fellow at the National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University. He is the author of several books, including Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (2001), which treats in greater detail some of the issues discussed in this essay. He also consults widely on issues of electoral-system design and reform. Funding from the United States Institute of Peace supported the research for this essay.
منابع مشابه
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies
Over the past half-century, democratic constitutional design has undergone a sea change. After the Second World War, newly independent countries tended simply to copy the basic constitutional rules of their former colonial masters, without seriously considering alternatives. Today, constitution writers choose more deliberately among a wide array of constitutional models, with various advantages...
متن کاملStable democracy and good governance in divided societies: Do power-sharing institutions work?
The research demonstrates three main findings: (i) worldwide, power-sharing constitutions combining PR and federalism remain relatively rare (only 13 out of 191 states); (ii) federalism was found to be unrelated to any of the indicators of good governance under comparison; and (iii) PR electoral systems, however, were positively related to some indicators of good governance, both worldwide and ...
متن کاملThe merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz
In Professor Horowitz’s rejoinders (2004, 2006) to Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a), he mischaracterizes our formal results, retreats from previous claims about the conditions for the alternative vote electoral system to generate centripetal outcomes, renders explicit his dubious assumptions about voter behavior in divided societies, and greatly exaggerates the global evidence in support of p...
متن کاملA neo - Downsian model of the alternative vote as a mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies ∗
Among those advocating the use of particular electoral mechanisms to reduce the prospects for conflict and strengthen democracy in societies that are deeply divided in ethnic or religious terms, there are two main approaches, one associated with Arend Lijphart, one with Donald Horowitz. Lijphart advocates using electoral rules such as list PR that strengthen the power of ethnically or religious...
متن کاملSocial Identity, Electoral Institutions, and the Number of Candidates
The existing empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are “permissive.” However, this literature lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions under different institutions in plural societies. This paper incorpora...
متن کامل