Reconfirming the Prenucleolus
نویسندگان
چکیده
By means of an example it is shown that the prenucleolus is not the only minimal solution that satisfies nonemptiness, Pareto optimality, covariance, the equal treatment property and the reduced game property, even if universe of players is infinite. This example also disproves a conjecture of Gurvich et al. Moreover, we prove that the prenucleolus is axiomatized by nonemptiness, covariance, the equal treatment property, and the reconfirmation property, provided the universe of players is infinite.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 28 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003