A Package Bidding Tool for the Fcc’s Spectrum Auctions, and Its Effect on Auction Outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a bidder aid tool that allows bidders to more effectively participate in combinatorial FCC spectrum auctions by enabling concise expression of preferences. In addition to logical relationships between items, bidders may express spectrum-specific preferences such as those related to minimum population coverage, bandwidth, and budget. The tool can be used to simultaneously generate and evaluate a set of most profitable biddable packages, both at the start of the auction and dynamically before each round. We also explore the effect of creating “best-fit” packages at each round. Our preliminary results show that the use of this tool may significantly simplify bidders’ efforts in generating packages of interest and lead to efficient auction outcomes.
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