Refining the dual-system theory of choice

We are highly sympathetic to Dhar and Gorlin's goal of developing a dual system theory of choice. But we do feel that the proposal could be changed and clarified in a few ways. Specifically, we believe that the evidence suggests that the systems operate in parallel, not sequentially. In addition, the relation between intuitive/associative processing and affect remains unresolved, a vagueness that is especially troublesome for the problem of choice. Relatedly, the description of System I as perceptual requires further explanation and refinement. Finally, we reconsider the attribution of the compromise effect to deliberative processing and propose an alternative explanation, one that reveals one aspect of the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processes. While further specification and testing of predictions are necessary, the proposal by Dhar and Gorlin makes a substantive contribution toward understanding how choices are made. © 2013 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.