Belief Revision And Epistemology

BELIEF REVISION AND TRUTHLIKENESS In December 1977, a conference on ÓThe Logic and Epistemology of Scientific ChangeÓ was

Formal Epistemology: An Introduction to Belief Revision, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and Conditionals

I. AGM Belief Revision Theory 1) The Elements of Epistemological Theories: Ch. 1 of [4]. 2) Models of Epistemic States: Ch. 2.1 – 2.5 of [4]. 3) Expansions, Revisions, and Contractions I: Ch. 3.1 – 3.4 of [4]. 4) Expansions, Revisions, and Contractions II: Ch. 3.5 – 3.7 of [4]. 5) Epistemic Entrenchment and Construction of Contraction Functions I: Ch. 4.1 – 4.4. of [4]. 6) Epistemic Entrenchmen...

Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science

Well, someone can decide by themselves what they want to do and need to do but sometimes, that kind of person will need some belief revision meets philosophy of science references. People with open minded will always try to seek for the new things and information from many sources. On the contrary, people with closed mind will always think that they can do it by their principals. So, what kind ...

TR-2010007: Robust Knowledge of Rationality

Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...

Robust Knowledge of Rationality

Stalnaker provided an example of a perfect information game in which common knowledge of rationality does not yield backward induction. However, in his example, knowledge is treated as defeasible: players forfeit their knowledge of rationality at some vertices. This is not how ‘knowledge’ is understood in epistemology where, unlike belief, it is not subject to revision. In this respect, the Sta...