Sophisticated Voting Rules: the Case of Two Tournaments
نویسندگان
چکیده
We characterize when a voting rule deened over two tournaments can be represented by sophisticated voting on a binary tree. This characterization has a particularly simple and intuitive specialization to the case that the two tournaments diier in exactly one place. These characterizations allow us to demonstrate the tree that implements a particular voting rule, and to show the minimality of an example of Moulin that shows that the Copeland rule cannot be implemented on a tree.
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