How Do Cartels Operate?
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 1999-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome, monitoring and punishment methods for enforcing it, the frequency of meetings, the organizational structure of cartels, and what preceded cartel formation.
منابع مشابه
DOES COLLUSION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION EXIST? Some Experimental Evidence
Tacit cartels did not arise in experimental triopoly markets even with the help of detailed instructions to prospective cartel members on how to coordinate actions. In duopoly markets tacit cartels were successful, with winning bids and supporting “pass” bids increasing gradually. A simulated third bidder, entering with known probability, prevented the buildup of cartel prices in duopoly market...
متن کاملToward the Discovery of Citation Cartels in Citation Networks
In this perspective, our goal is to present and elucidate a thus far largely overlooked problem that is arising in scientific publishing, namely the identification and discovery of citation cartels in citation networks. Taking from the well-known definition of a community in the realm of network science, namely that people within a community share significantly more links with each other as the...
متن کاملWelfare Effects of Partial Cartels
One of the suggested topics for discussion in the workshop is the question ‘under which circumstances cartels typically do not have any (or particularly high) adverse price effects’. In this context, the problem of partial or incomplete cartels, i.e. cartels that do not include all or almost all firms in a market but are comparatively small relative to the overall market, could be of interest.
متن کاملGlobal Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact ...
متن کاملWhen Does a Self-Serving Antitrust Authority Act in Society’s Best Interests?∗
If an antitrust authority chooses policies to maximize the number of successfully prosecuted cartels, when do those policies also serve to minimize the number of cartels that form? When the detection and prosecution of cartels is inherently difficult, we find that an antitrust authority’s policies minimize the number of cartels, as is socially desirable. But when the detection and prosecution o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics
دوره 2 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006